Citation

Wu CK. Environ. Res. 2021; ePub(ePub): ePub.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2021, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.envres.2021.110737

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The proposed model determines the allocation of security forces in response to terrorist events with a series of coordinated attacks such as the Paris terror attacks in 2015. Two games are constructed, representing the two stages needed for the rapid deployment of security forces. The first stage applies a firearms assault game to analyze the interaction behaviors between the response agent (or security force commander) and the attackers in each response district. The terrorist threat value (TV) during a firearms assault event can then be derived from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The TVs are input to the second stage for computing the Shapley value for each event, in terms of the majority of TVs of all firearms assaults. The Shapley values are then used to create a set for reallocation of the limited security forces to respond to the multiple firearms assaults. The experimental results show the proposed division to fairer than the proportional division for allocating security forces.

Language: en

Keywords

Nash equilibrium; Security force deployment; Shapley value; Terrorist threat value