Citation

Lougheed K. Soc. Epistomiol. 2021; 35(1): 85-98.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2021, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/02691728.2020.1794079

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In my recent book, The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement, I develop a defense of non-conciliationism, but one that only applies in research contexts: Epistemic benefits are more likely in the offing if inquirers "stick to their guns" in the face of disagreement. I aim to expand my original account by examining its implications for non-inquiry beliefs. I'm particularly interested in broader worldview disagreements. I want to examine how inquirers should react upon discovering that they disagree about the truth value of a particular proposition because they disagree about a whole host of related propositions. I argue that in many ways, worldview disagreements are easier to work with than disagreement over isolated propositions, in part because it is easier to provide a set of criteria by which to evaluate worldviews. I conclude that my original argument can, at least in part, be successfully expanded to include worldview disagreement.

Language: en

Keywords

Epistemology of disagreement; non-conciliationism; worldview disagreement