Citation

Arends H. J. Public Policy 2021; 41(4): 706-730.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2021, Cambridge University Press)

DOI

10.1017/S0143814X20000239

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Fiscal decentralisation theory calls for enhanced local revenue and spending responsibilities to promote the efficiency of public service delivery. However, some have pointed to the danger of local capture cancelling out these effects. I examine the argument that organised crime violence (OCV) intensifies as mafias fight for access to local government resources, which they consider an attractive income source. I regress violence on local spending (LS) in Mexican municipalities over the period 1995-2015. I find a significant relationship between LS and the intensity of violence: higher levels of LS per capita are strongly related to higher homicide rates, conditional on them being positive. However, LS does not determine the probability of OCV taking place in the first place. The results suggest that caution should be exercised when initiating decentralisation reforms in the context of local capture and OCV.

Language: en

Keywords

fiscal decentralisation; Latin America; local capture; Mexico; organised crime; violence