Citation

Apolte T. Def. Peace Econ. 2020; 31(5): 469-484.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2020, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10242694.2019.1582167

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

We explore the supply side of the market for suicide attackers. While the strategic edge of suicide attacks for certain terrorist organizations has been thoroughly explored, the motivation of the suppliers remains quite mysterious. We develop a model of the supply of suicide attacks, the motivation of which is expressive but time inconsistent. The model implies terrorist organizations to provide a commitment device in exchange for the 'services' of those suicide attackers that do not suffer from any mental or physical burden of life. By contrast, suicide attackers that do suffer from some sufficiently severe burden of life are not reliant on any commitment device and should therefore be expected to more frequently act as lonesome-wolf attackers. © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

Language: en

Keywords

Conflict; terrorism; suicide attacks; national security