Citation

Garrett TM. Am. Rev. Public Admin. 2004; 34(4): 389-402.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2004, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0275074004269410

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The Challenger and Columbia similarities in management decision making with regard to the ill-fated shuttle mission failures bear scrutiny. Key aspects of both tragedies include senior-level managers ignoring the advice from experts within the NASA organization leading to tragedy. NASA is typical of modern organizations in the tendency to relegate worker knowledge below that of managers and executives. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board has determined that the organizational/management culture was a key factor in the demise of the Columbia. The author argues that culture, although an important contributor to the tragedy, is inadequate for assessing the problem. Differences in knowledge between executives, managers, and the workers are key to unlocking the central problem of the NASA organization. The author uses and develops the theoretical approach that delves into multiple knowledges in organizations that is known as the "knowledge analytic."