Citation

Mirkin H. J. Homosex. 2009; 56(2): 233-267.

Affiliation

Department of Political Science, University of Missouri-Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri 64110, USA. mirkinh@umkc.edu

Copyright

(Copyright © 2009, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/00918360802623198

PMID

19197651

Abstract

This article examines the construction of the concept of child pornography, developed in several Supreme Court decisions. New York v. Ferber (1982) separated child pornography from adult obscenity, and soon thereafter almost all pictures of nude children became illegal. These images had been common in art and usually signified innocence, although they often had an erotic component. The assumption that images of nude youths can only be viewed erotically is a significant change. The justification-that children were hurt in producing child pornography, and that distribution (even no-cost distribution) and private possession contributed to that harm-does not hold up under analysis. It is statistically flawed and inconsistent with other Court decisions. Justice Kennedy's decision in Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition supports the argument that the images are forbidden because they challenge the ideology of the innocent child. Since erotic images of adults are common, understanding the different treatment of youths is important for understanding contemporary sexual politics.

Language: en