Citation

Farah MJ. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 1989; 15(1): 188-194.

Affiliation

Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213-3890.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1989, American Psychological Association)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

2522529

Abstract

Both semantic priming and perceptual priming consist of facilitation of the identification of primed stimuli and inhibition of the identification of nonprimed stimuli. The similarities between the two phenomena suggest that a common attentional mechanism underlies both, and this has been explicitly proposed by several attention theorists. In this article it is argued that the phenomena of semantic and perceptual priming are qualitatively different, perceptual priming reflecting a sensitivity change in the recognition process brought about by attention, and semantic priming reflecting a bias change in the recognition process brought about by attention. Because different mechanisms are required to produce sensitivity and bias changes, this implies that the attentional mechanisms responsible for semantic and perceptual priming are distinct. In terms of recent discussions of the modularity versus the unity of cognitive architecture, the present conclusion supports a modular architecture for attentional processes.

Language: en