Citation

Marra R, Orrù M. Br. J. Sociol. 1991; 42(2): 273-288.

Affiliation

University of Genoa, Italy.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1991, London School of Economics and Political Science, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

1878763

Abstract

Emile Durkheim's analysis of historical attitudes of societies toward suicide led him to claim that (1) the social disapproval of suicidal conduct increased constantly from ancient times to the present; (2) such increased disapproval was generated by the growing emphasis put on the dignity and sacredness of the individual; (3) the condemnation of suicidal conduct was therefore essentially moral, and it expressed the strong reaction of the collective conscience against offenses to the cult of the individual. In this study we show that Durkheim's interpretation of the historical evidence is erroneous: not increasing condemnation of suicide, but rather tolerance or mild aversion is the typical social response to suicide. Also, when confronted with the historical evidence, Durkheim's claim that increased disapproval of suicide accompanied increased consideration for the dignity of the individual is shown to be unfounded. Our argument develops in four steps. First, we survey the historical evidence on views of suicidal conduct from classical times to the nineteenth-century; second, we present the moral statistics literature on suicide which flourished during Durkheim's lifetime; third, we analyze Durkheim's own theory of anomic suicide. In the conclusion we propose an alternative interpretation of the historical evidence on attitudes on suicide, and a different framework in which to highlight their significance in contemporary society.

Language: en