Citation

Heller KJ. J. Crim. Law Criminol. 2009; 99(2): 317-379.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2009, Northwestern University School of Law)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This Article provides a comprehensive-though admittedly speculative-explanation of how jurors use projection and prototyping, two simulation-based theories of mind-reading, to make mental-state attributions in criminal cases. The first two Parts explain why jurors are unlikely to use a functionalist method of mind-reading in a case that focuses on the defendant's mens rea. The next three Parts introduce projection and prototyping, describe the evidence that jurors actually use them to make mental-state determinations, and discuss the cognitive mechanism-perceived similarity between juror and defendant-that determines which one a juror will use in a particular case. The final two Parts explain why projection and prototyping are likely to result in inaccurate mental-state determinations and discuss debiasing techniques that may make them more accurate.