Citation

Elazar DS. Br. J. Sociol. 2000; 51(3): 461-488.

Affiliation

Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel Aviv University.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2000, London School of Economics and Political Science, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

11038133

Abstract

This study examines the determination of the Italian Fascists' extra-parliamentary, para-military, violent strategy. What were the effects of the socialists' political strategy, relying on electoral democracy, on the creation and strategy of the Fascist Action Squads? A comparison among Italy's 69 provinces, based on quantitative and qualitative historical evidence reveals a distinct pattern in the Fascists' violence. They attacked mainly provinces where the Socialists enjoyed the greatest electoral support. This pattern was a product of two historical processes: (a) the threat of the Socialist party to the landlords' economic and political hegemony, and (b) the landlords' tradition of militant anti-worker organization which culminated in their alliance with the Fascists. The Fascists' struggle for, and takeover of, political power was not an immanent historical necessity. It was first and foremost an anti-socialist reaction. It was shaped both 'from below', by the political power and radicalism of the PSI and the para-military capacity of the Fascist Squads; and 'from above', by the active support the Fascists received from the landlords and the state. Supported by organized landlords and blessed with the authorities' benevolence, the Squads were able to destroy - physically and politically - the legitimately constituted provincial governments of the Socialists. The alliance with the landlords determined the Squads' almost exclusive attacks on Socialist provincial strongholds that constituted the greatest threat to the landlords' interests, while provinces dominated by the ruling Liberal party were excluded from the Squads' path of 'punitive expeditions'.

Language: en