Citation

Roberts PAUL. Br. J. Criminol. 1996; 36(1): 37-60.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1996, Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, Publisher Oxford University Press)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The organization and regulation of forensic science services are scrutinized and evaluated in the light of important and extensive recent developments. The tension between free market competition and external regulation is identified as the central focus for inquiry, and this tension is explored through an analysis of two principal themes in the Runciman Royal Commission's recommendations, namely: (i) free market competition in forensic science services and (ii) regulation of the forensic science community by a Forensic Science Advisory Council. Contextual links with broader developments in the forms of government, administration and political participation are suggested. It is argued that the market approach to forensic science services is flawed in principle. After drawing attention to one fundamental objection--that the language of market exchange irrevocably distorts and debases the pursuit of criminal justice--the economic arguments are considered squarely on their merits. Economic theory is used to derive three predictions which, when taken together, provide a powerful case against extending the market mechanism to forensic science services. The proposal for external regulation by a Forensic Science Advisory Council is endorsed as long overdue, but it is suggested that effective regulation is incompatible with free market principles.