Citation

Azam J, Saadi-Sedik T. Def. Peace Econ. 2004; 15(4): 343-364.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2004, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/1024269042000201935

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator's participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented.