Citation

Ferjencik M. Safety Sci. 2010; 48(10): 1530-1544.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2010, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.ssci.2010.06.003

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Twenty-six years ago, a massive accident occurred in the Semtin explosives plant in Czechoslovakia. The results of investigations which were carried out (but kept confidential at the time) were made available after 1989, but have not been published in a summarized form to date. Reopening of the results of old investigations and application of root cause analysis deepens our understanding of accident causes and leads to the conclusion that, according to today's standards, the analysis was not completed at the time of the accident and therefore neither some of the practical aspects of the event nor the social, professional, and political climate it should have exposed have ever been fully understood. New analysis shows that plant safety management had decayed. The results demonstrate as well how substantial a shift has occurred in the understanding of causes and in performing and organizing their analyses during the elapsed quarter-century. The new examination employs a few innovations of root cause analysis. A tight connection between the analysis and the assumptions about the structure of safety management of investigated processes will be underlined. Suitable illustration will be proposed. Detail requirements on the form and content of a root cause map will be specified. Finally it is shown that even the root cause analysis has its limitations and that it may not be sufficient to finish the investigation of causes satisfactorily. This motivates for the identification of levels of causes which underlie the root causes.