Citation

Whiteley JR, Mannan MS. J. Hazard. Mater. 2004; 115(1-3): 163-167.

Affiliation

Chemical Engineering, Oklahoma State University, 423 Engineering North, Stillwater, OK 74078-5021, USA. whitele@ceat.okstate.edu

Copyright

(Copyright © 2004, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.jhazmat.2004.05.011

PMID

15518979

Abstract

Terrorist and criminal acts are now considered credible risks in the process industries. Deliberate attacks on the nation's petroleum refineries and chemical plants would pose a significant threat to public welfare, national security, and the US economy. To-date, the primary response of government and industry has been on improved security to prevent attacks and the associated consequences. While prevention is clearly preferred, the potential for successful attacks must be addressed. If plant security is breached, the extent of the inflicted damage is determined by the available plant safety systems and procedures. We refer to this "inside the gate" response as process threat management. The authors have initiated a joint industry/academia study to address: the level of safety provided by existing plant equipment and safety systems in response to a terrorist act, and identification of process (rather than security) needs or opportunities to address this new safety concern. This paper describes the initial perspectives and issues identified by the team at the beginning of the study.

Language: en