Citation

Matsumoto Y, Jin N. Jpn. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 2010; 50(1): 15-27.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2010, Nihon Gurupu Dainamikkusu Gakkai)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In actual society, social dilemmas are thought to be resolved through interdependency between group leaders, who punish defectors, and group members, who support these leaders. The aim of this study was to examine conditions in which interdependency arises between group leaders and members through evolutionary gaming simulation. In our simulation, there were 20 groups that consisted of 20 members and one leader. Leaders were able to punish not only defectors but also individuals who do not support them. Computer simulations were conducted, which revealed that when certain conditions are met, leaders arise who punish both defectors and individuals who do not support them, and that by doing so, most members are coerced to cooperate with and support the leader, thereby resolving the social dilemma. In particular, a necessary condition was that leaders are not able to keep his/her position unless s/he maximizes both individual and group gains.