Citation

Teigen KH, Filkuková P. Scand. J. Psychol. 2011; 52(1): 8-20.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, Scandinavian Psychological Associations, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1467-9450.2010.00843.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Teigen, K.H. & Filkuková, P. (2011). Are lies more wrong than errors? Accuracy judgments of inaccurate statements. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 52, 8–20.

People are often mistaken when estimating and predicting quantities, and sometimes they report values that they know are false: they lie. There exists, however, little research devoted to how such deviations are being perceived. In four vignette studies, participants were asked to rate the accuracy of inaccurate statements about quantities (prices, numbers and amounts). The results indicate that overstatements are generally judged to be more inaccurate than understatements of the same magnitude; self‐favorable (optimistic) statements are considered more inaccurate than unfavorable (pessimistic) statements, and false reports (lies) are perceived to be more inaccurate than equally mistaken estimates. Lies about the future did not differ from lies about the past, but own lies were perceived as larger than the same lies attributed to another person. It is suggested that estimates are judged according to how close they come to the true values (close estimates are more correct than estimates that are less close), whereas lies are judged as deviant from truth, with less importance attached to the magnitude of the deviation.