Citation

Pugh J. Negot. J. 2009; 25(1): 83-105.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2009, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00209.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

During more than a decade of violent conflict (1980–1992) involving the military, rebel forces, and paramilitary “death squads,” El Salvador suffered some 75,000 casualties, mostly civilians. After three years of negotiations, the government and the largest rebel group signed a historic comprehensive peace accord that brought an end to the war and instituted wide-reaching political and social reforms. This agreement, and the peace process that produced it, has been widely hailed as a successful example of a negotiated end to civil war. In order to understand the conditions that led to the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords ending the war, this article tests ripeness theory in the context of the Salvadoran peace process.