Citation

Wolford S, Reiter D, Carrubba CJ. J. Conflict Resolut. 2011; 55(4): 556-579.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0022002710393921

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The authors analyze a bargaining model of war that incorporates both commitment problems due to shifting power and asymmetric information. Four results emerge when both bargaining problems are present. First, in contrast to asymmetric information models, the resolution of uncertainty through fighting can lead to the continuation of war rather than its termination. Second, wars can be less--not more--likely to end in settlement the longer they last. Third, war aims increase over time as a belligerent becomes more confident that its opponent will grow unacceptably strong in the future. Finally, the dynamics that characterize wars in purely asymmetric information or commitment models should exist only when the other factor is absent.