Citation

Wild J, Maher J, Frazee RC, Craun ML, Davis ML, Childs EW, Smith RW. J. Trauma Acute Care Surg. 2012; 72(6): 1709-1713.

Affiliation

Division of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery (J.W., J.M., R.C.F., M.L.D., E.W.C., R.W.S.), Department of Surgery, Texas A&M Health Science Center, Scott & White Hospital, Temple, Texas; and Division of Trauma Services (M.L.C.), Round Rock Medical Center, Round Rock, Texas.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2012, Lippincott Williams and Wilkins)

DOI

10.1097/TA.0b013e318250cd10

PMID

22695445

Abstract

BACKGROUND: On November 5, 2009, an army psychiatrist at Fort Hood in Killeen, TX, allegedly opened fire at the largest US military base in the world, killing 13 and wounding 32. METHODS: Data from debriefing sessions, news media, and area hospitals were reviewed. RESULTS: Ten patients were initially transferred to the regional Level I trauma center. The remainder of the shooting victims were triaged to two other local regional hospitals. National news networks broadcasted the Level I trauma center's referral phone line which resulted in more than 1,300 calls. The resulting difficulties in communication led to the transfer of two victims (one critical) to a regional hospital without a trauma designation. CONCLUSIONS: Triage at the scene was compromised by a lack of a secure environment, leading to undertriage of several patients. Overload of routine communication pathways compounded the problem, suggesting redundancy is crucial. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Prognostic study, level V.

Language: en