Citation

Shnayderman R. Ethical Perspect. 2015; 22(2): 247-270.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2015, European Centre for Ethics)

DOI

10.2143/EP.22.2.3085108

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The most recent literature on the idea of freedom focuses on the liberal-republican debate regarding the question whether freedom should be defined as non-interference or non-domination. One of the main issues within this debate is whether the liberal concept of freedom as non-interference can properly account for the freedom-restrictive nature of domination. In a recent article, however, Michael Harbour argues that, as a matter of fact, neither the liberal concept of freedom as non-interference nor the republican concept of freedom as non-domination is able to properly account for the loss of freedom one suffers under domination. He thus concludes by suggesting that none of the concepts of freedom prominent in the literature can properly account for the freedom-restrictive nature of domination. The present article seeks to refute Harbour's disturbing argument. By doing so it also sheds further light on the ideas of freedom as non-domination and freedom as noninterference and particularly on the precise manner in which domination is inimical to freedom.

Language: en