Citation

Baum P, Danziger R. Terrorism 1989; 12(2): 97-105.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1989)

DOI

10.1080/10576108908435772

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

On August 8, 1989, Fatah's Fifth General Congress issued in Tunis a hard‐line "Political Program" packed with statements and phrases denigrating Israel and denying its right to exist. The program disclosed a Fatah decision to set up a committee to oppose "Zionist immigration" to Israel and vowed to intensify and escalate "armed action and all forms of struggle" against it. Rejecting Israel's election proposal, Fatah announced such tough conditions for its own participation in the political process as to render it virtually impossible. Faced with harsh U.S. criticism of its Political Program, Fatah issued on August 11 a "Final Political Statement" in which part of the program's language was toned down and some of its resolutions softened or omitted. The final statement could not supersede the program which had been adopted by 1200 Fatah delegates, but since it doubtless was sanctioned by Arafat and other authoritative Fatah officials, both documents may be considered valid and binding. As there are no formal contradictions between them and since the final statement did not repudiate anything in the program, it is evident that Fatah merely sought to present the program in a more palatable form and not to abrogate or annul any of its provisions. Fatah's Political Program accurately reflects Arafat's wishes as expressed in his address to the Congress's opening session and those of his closest associates as exposed in their comments during the Congress's deliberations. It would seem that the Fatah leadership retreated from the conciliatory Geneva statement and even from the tougher Algiers Palestine National Council resolutions mainly because the apparent U.S. acquiescence to previous intransigent PLO statements diminished their motivation to issue a conciliatory program. At the same time, the condemnations of Arafat's statement in Geneva by most PLO factions provided him with a powerful incentive to retreat to the old anti‐Israel invective. The recent weakening of the intifada leadership which had previously prodded the PLO to moderate its positions and Fatah's disappointment in the results of the U.S.‐PLO dialogue may also have contributed to the hardening of the Fatah line. At the start of the dialogue in December 1988, U.S. officials stated that talks would continue only as long as the PLO adhered to Arafat's pledges in Geneva. Beyond warning the PLO to avoid repeating negative statements such as the Fatah program, it is incumbent upon the Bush administration to notify the PLO that, unless it publicly reaffirms Arafat's Geneva commitments without surrounding the reaffirmation with pronouncements and claims that undermine and contradict the very heart of those commitments, the dialogue will be suspended. Given the PLO's eagerness to maintain the dialogue, it is more than likely to comply.

Language: en