Citation

Ikuenobe P. Dev. World Bioeth. 2018; 18(3): 212-221.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/dewb.12161

PMID

28872755

Abstract

I argue that the metaphysical capacity of autonomy is not intrinsically valuable; it is valuable only when used in relation to a community's values and instrumentally for making the proper choices that will promote one's own and the community's well-being. I use the example of the choice to take one's life by suicide to illuminate this view. I articulate a plausible African conception of personhood as a basis for the idea of relational autonomy. I argue that this conception is better understood as a social-moral thesis, and not a metaphysical thesis. A metaphysical thesis gives an account of the abstract nature of an atomic individual, his agency, and rational choice. The social-moral thesis indicates that personhood and autonomy are positive and relational to the life plans, well-being, material conditions, and the best means for achieving them that are made available and possible by harmonious living in a community. This idea of autonomy is not just having the capacity of freewill; it also involves how such freewill is used, in terms of how an individual's choices are guided by internalized communal values.

© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Language: en

Keywords

African communalism; metaphysical autonomy; moral personhood; relational autonomy; suicide in African tradition