Citation

Zhou Y, Zhao X, Jiang Y, Shang F, Deng S, Wang X. Sensors (Basel) 2017; 17(12): s17122854.

Affiliation

School of Electronic Engineering, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland. xiaojun.wang@dcu.ie.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2017, MDPI: Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute)

DOI

10.3390/s17122854

PMID

29292792

Abstract

Vehicle sensor networks (VSNs) are ushering in a promising future by enabling more intelligent transportation systems and providing a more efficient driving experience. However, because of their inherent openness, VSNs are subject to a large number of potential security threats. Although various authentication schemes have been proposed for addressing security problems, they are not suitable for VSN applications because of their high computation and communication costs. Chuang and Lee have developed a trust-extended authentication mechanism (TEAM) for vehicle-to-vehicle communication using a transitive trust relationship, which they claim can resist various attacks. However, it fails to counter internal attacks because of the utilization of a shared secret key. In this paper, to eliminate the vulnerability of TEAM, an enhanced privacy-preserving authentication scheme for VSNs is constructed. The security of our proposed scheme is proven under the random oracle model based on the assumption of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.

Language: en

Keywords

V2V; authentication; provable security; vehicle sensor network