Citation

Keels E. Int. Interact. 2018; 44(1): 33-58.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/03050629.2017.1296834

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

One of the most common features found within peace agreements is provisions that call for post-civil war elections. Unfortunately, the initial post-war elections often increase the risk of civil war recurrence. While past research has consistently confirmed this finding, it focuses only on one element of the democracy. Rather than focusing solely on elections, this article examines the laws surrounding the electoral process. Specifically, I examine how changes in electoral laws that are called for in peace agreements impacts the risk of renewed civil war. Building on research that examines the context of post-civil war elections, I argue that reforms to electoral laws that precede the initial post-war election substantially reduce the risks associated with that election. This proposition is supported with evidence from survival models of peace failures following the establishment of comprehensive peace agreements from 1989 to 2010, demonstrating that electoral reforms reduce the risk of civil war recurrence.

Language: en

Keywords

Civil War; democracy; elections; negotiated settlement; peace agreement