Citation

Moore E. Sport Ethics Philos. 2017; 11(4): 413-427.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2017, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/17511321.2017.1292306

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the idea that under one way of understanding cheating, Armstrong did not fulfill any of the three necessary conditions: (1) that cheating violates a rule--I will make the case that though doping was against the official rules, it was not against the rules the athletes used; (2) that it is cheating if the intent is to obtain an unfair advantage--I will argue that dopers were not attempting to obtain an unfair advantage, at least on one plausible understanding of fairness; and (3) that cheating requires fair enforcement of the rules--I will show that the official rules against doping were hardly enforced at all, much less fairly enforced, and thus lacked enough sufficient normative force to deem breaking them cheating.

Language: en

Keywords

Cheating; conventionalism; doping; formalism; Lance Armstrong