Citation

Shultz RH. Stud. Conflict Terrorism 2017; 40(10): 809-837.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2017, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/1057610X.2016.1239990

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

U.S. counterterrorism (CT) forces that deployed to Iraq in 2003 as Task Force 714 (TF 714) faced an ugly surprise. Tasked to dismantle the al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) dominated insurgency, the organization could not achieve that mission. General Stanley McChrystal, who commanded TF 714 concluded, "we were losing to an enemy … we should have dominated." But TF 714 transformed in the midst of war and during 2006-2009 was able to largely dismantle AQI's clandestine networks to a degree that they could no longer function in a cohesive manner. By developing the capacity to operate inside those networks, TF 714 was able, in the words of General McChrystal, to "claw the guts out of AQI." This transformation runs counter to what organizational experts identify as barriers inhibiting militaries from learning, innovating, and changing, especially in wartime. To decipher the puzzle of how TF 714 overcame these barriers, two questions are addressed in this study: 1) How did TF 714 transform from a specialized and compartmented unit customized for executing infrequent CT missions in peacetime to a wartime industrial-strength CT machine that by 2009 dismantled AQI's networks that operated across Iraq; and 2) Why was TF 714 able to achieve this remarkable transformation?

Language: en