Citation

Martin JW, Jordan JJ, Rand DG, Cushman F. Cognition 2019; 193: 104040.

Affiliation

Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2019, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104040

PMID

31408816

Abstract

People often punish norm violations. In what cases is such punishment viewed as normative-a behavior that we "should" or even "must" engage in? We approach this question by asking when people who fail to punish a norm violator are, themselves, punished. (For instance, a boss who fails to punish transgressive employees might, herself, be fired.) We conducted experiments exploring the contexts in which higher-order punishment occurs, using both incentivized economic games and hypothetical vignettes describing everyday situations. We presented participants with cases in which an individual fails to punish a transgressor, either as a victim (second party) or as an observer (third party). Across studies, we consistently observed higher-order punishment of non-punishing observers. Higher-order punishment of non-punishing victims, however, was consistently weaker, and sometimes non-existent. These results demonstrate the selective application of higher-order punishment, provide a new perspective on the psychological mechanisms that support it, and provide some clues regarding its function.

Copyright © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Language: en

Keywords

Adaptation; Cooperation; Norms; Punishment