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Citation |
Heesen R. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2019; 76: 5-12. |
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Affiliation |
Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Western Australia, Crawley, WA, 6009, Australia; Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, CB3 9DA, UK. Electronic address: remco.heesen@uwa.edu.au. |
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Copyright |
(Copyright © 2019, Pergamon Press) |
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DOI |
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PMID |
31558210 |
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Abstract |
There is a commonly made distinction between two types of scientists: risk-taking, trailblazing mavericks and detail-oriented followers. A number of recent papers have discussed the question what a desirable mixture of mavericks and followers looks like. Answering this question is most useful if a scientific community can be steered toward such a desirable mixture. One attractive route is through credit incentives: manipulating rewards so that reward-seeking scientists are likely to form the desired mixture of their own accord. Here I argue that (even in theory) this idea is less straightforward than it may seem. Interpreting mavericks as scientists who prioritize rewards over speed and risk, I show in a deliberatively simple model that there is a fixed mixture which is not particularly likely to be desirable and which credit incentives cannot alter. I consider a way around this result, but this has some major drawbacks. I conclude that credit incentives are not as promising a way to create a desirable mixture of mavericks and followers as one might have thought. Language: en |