Citation

Ji L, Liu W, Zhang Y. Front. Psychol. 2021; 12: e796295.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2021, Frontiers Research Foundation)

DOI

10.3389/fpsyg.2021.796295

PMID

34966339

PMCID

PMC8710510

Abstract

The unsafe behavior of construction workers is one of the most important and direct causes of safety accidents. Managers usually develop effective incentives aimed at regulating worker safety behavior. Due to the large number of workers in construction projects, there are multiple differences in fairness preference, risk preference and ability level, which will lead to the complex effect of the traditional mechanism to regulate workers' safety behavior. In order to improve the effectiveness of incentive measures for worker safety behavior, this paper takes into account the multiple differences of individual workers' fairness preference, risk preference and ability level, based on the tournament mechanism to construct a competition incentive model. By designing a tournament reward and salary distribution for heterogeneous workers, the occurrence of unsafe behaviors can be reduced. The study found that in terms of the optimal level of safety investment, workers with risk aversion attitude generally invest higher than that of workers with risk preference, no matter whether they have a strong fairness preference or not; In terms of the distribution of tournament rewards, workers with a risk aversion attitude and a higher level of fairness preference need to be given higher incentives.

Language: en

Keywords

safety behavior; construction workers; multiple heterogeneity; risk appetite; tournament incentive mechanism