Citation

Miller S. J. Med. Philos. 2022; 47(6): 723-734.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2022, Society for Health and Human Values, Publisher University of Chicago Press)

DOI

10.1093/jmp/jhac028

PMID

36562840

Abstract

In this article, I undertake three main tasks. First, I argue that, contrary to the standard view, moral injury is not a species of PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) but rather, on the most coherent conception of moral injury, PTSD is (in effect) a species of moral injury. In doing so, I make use of the notion of caring deeply about something or someone worthy of being cared deeply about. Second, I consider so-called "dirty hands" actions in police work and in war, and distinguish these from the morally legitimate, but harmful, actions of police officers and of war fighters, such as the morally legitimate use of coercive force and lethal force (respectively). While the morally legitimate use of harmful methods is constitutive of these occupational roles, "dirty hands" methods are not. Roughly speaking, a "dirty hands" action is one that is morally wrong and (typically) unlawful but done for the sake of a good outcome. Both categories of action are conducive to moral injury, but "dirty hands" actions much more so, especially given the slippery moral slope from "dirty hands" actions to egregious moral wrongdoing. Third, I offer some recommendations for reducing moral injury among police officers and war fighters.

Language: en

Keywords

Trauma; PTSD; stress; cognitive impairment; war; “dirty hands”; care ethics; caring deeply; combatants; moral injury; noble cause corruption; police officers; police work; psychological injury; war fighters; worth caring about