Citation

Sugimoto T, Moriyama T, Fukuda T. J. Japan Soc. Safety Eng. 2022; 61(3): 177-185.

Vernacular Title

日本の安全文化は国際慣行とどこが違ったか

Copyright

(Copyright © 2022, Japan Society for Safety Engineering)

DOI

10.18943/safety.61.3_177

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Until the Fukushima nuclear accident, Japan's safety culture was said to be inconsistent with international practice and lacking. For a period from 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger, nuclear Chernobyl, and Space Shuttle Columbia accidents shook Western society, and the shocks made them move toward a culture of safety. In the case of Japan, the three accidents and the resulting indifference to safety culture left an important part of safety assurance blank for about 25 years until the Fukushima nuclear accident. There are five barriers to understanding safety culture. In particular, having a legitimate interest in regulatory administration, resolving conflicts between engineers responsible for specialized technology and managers responsible for management, and allowing individuals to think and act for themselves and take responsibility for their own results. There is the issue of “establishment of individuality”. [via Google Translate]

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福島原子力事故まで，日本の安全文化は国際的慣行と一致せず，不足があったといわれる．1986 年からの一時期，スペースシャトルのチャレンジャー，原子力のチェルノービリ，再びスペースシャトルのコロンビアの三つの事故は，西洋社会を震撼させ，その衝撃が，安全文化へ向かわせた．日本の場合，三つの事故とそこから導かれた安全文化への無関心が，福島原子力事故までの約25 年間，安全確保の大切な部分を空白にしてきた．安全文化を理解するには，五つの関門があり，それを一つずつたどると，日本の課題が見えてくる．特に，規制行政に正当な関心を持つこと，専門技術を担う技術者とマネジメントを担う経営者との相反の解決，および，個人が自分で考え，行動し，その結果に自分で責任をとる「個の確立」，という課題がある．

Language: ja

Keywords

個人の重要性; 安全文化; 科学技術の安全確保; 経営者と技術者の相反; 規制行政