Citation

Duffee C. J. Med. Ethics 2023; ePub(ePub): ePub.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2023, BMJ Publishing Group)

DOI

10.1136/jme-2023-109183

PMID

37474303

Abstract

This paper has two aims. The first is to defend a recent critique of the leading medical theory of suffering, which alleges too narrow a focus on violent experiences of suffering. Although sympathetic to this critique, I claim that it lacks a counterexample of the kinds of experiences the leading theory is said to neglect. Drawing on recent clinical cases and the longer intellectual history of suffering, my paper provides this missing counterexample. I then answer some possible objections to my defence, before turning to my second aim: an expansion of my counterexample into a spectrum of suffering that varies according to the selves and purposes that suffering affects. Next, I connect this spectrum to the tolerability of suffering, which I distinguish from its affective intensity. I conclude by outlining some applications of this distinction for the psychometric reliability of assessment instruments that measure suffering in clinical contexts.

Language: en

Keywords

ethics; palliative care; persons; philosophy; religion