Citation

Shu C, Jia YIN, Bo S, Yun C, Yue W. China Saf. Sci. J. 2023; 33(12): 8-15.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2023, China Occupational Safety and Health Association, Publisher Gai Xue bao)

DOI

10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2023.12.2163

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This study aims to improve the current situation of high incidence of accidents in the process of construction work safety. The possible rent-seeking phenomenon of introducing the intermediary services for work safety was analyzed. By applying the method of game theory, a 3-party evolutionary game model was established among construction enterprises, work safety service providers and government regulators. The evolutionary characteristics of the 3-party behaviors were analyzed, and the stability of the equilibrium point in the game system was simulated. The results show that the high cost of implementing safety management makes the construction enterprises and work safety service providers choose behavior strategies that are not conducive to the safety management of construction projects. Reasonable control of the maintenance and rectification costs and the safety management inputs enables them to actively implement safety management strategies. In the process of supervision, the government should focus on work safety service providers, strengthening the regulation of the providers' behaviour, and guide the construction enterprises to act in accordance with the rules, which is conductive to achieving the goal of regulating the behaviour of both sides while saving costs and inputs. Simulating the public to actively participate in the supervision of construction safety and increasing the rent-seeking costs of enterprises and the speculative costs of providers can well guide the supervision of construction enterprises and work safety service providers to standardize their behaviour.

Language: en