Citation

Gilbert AM. J. Crim. Law Criminol. 1997; 87(3): 842-863.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1997, Northwestern University School of Law)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In Bailey v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to "use" a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sect 924(c)(1), a criminal defendant must actively employ the weapon. In separate and unrelated cases, petitioners Roland J. Bailey and Candisha S. Robinson were convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of, inter alia, using or carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sect 924(c)(1). Different panels of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed and reversed the petitioners' convictions, respectively. The D.C. Circuit subsequently consolidated the two cases for en banc reconsideration, wherein the court affirmed both Bailey's and Robinson's convictions. Bailey and Robinson then jointly petitioned for certiorari and the Supreme Court of the United States granted the petition in order to clarify the meaning of "use" under Sect 924(c)(1). This Note argues that the Court properly concluded that a defendant must "actively employ" a firearm in a manner that makes the firearm an operative factor in the predicate crime in order to violate 18 U.S.C. Sect 924(c)(1). The Note then explains how the unanimous decision, written by Justice O'Connor, narrowed the scope of Sect 924(c)(1) from the broad, far-reaching scope that O'Connor herself had implied in the majority opinion in Smith v. United States, a previous Supreme Court decision regarding the scope of conduct reached by the statute. Finally, this Note discusses whether the Court's recommendation that prosecutors charge offenders who mix guns and drugs under the "carry" prong of Sect 924(c) could lead lower courts to expand the statute's scope to reach the very conduct that the Court excluded in Bailey. As a normative matter, the Note argues that an astute definition of "carrying a firearm" should not include storing a firearm which is proximate to and accessible during a drug transaction.

Language: en