Citation

Key VO. Am. J. Sociol. 1935; 40(5): 624-636.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1935, University of Chicago Press)

DOI

10.1086/216900

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

According to evidence before the Lexow Committee in 1894, police protection of underworld activities resulted from relationship directly between the police and individual operators of small businesses of the underworld. This changed with the introduction of highly organized methods. A large proportion of a given line of illegal activity is brought under centralized control. The organization may be under the management of one individual carrying on a single line of business.Operators may own their business but be subject to the dictation of a syndicate. A corollary of the licensing power is the power to instigate police raids upon independent competitors. The granting of protection may be centralized for the entire city in the hands of a powerful official, who deals with the syndicate head or heads. When a city-wide arrangement cannot be made, the syndicate must deal with the individual police captains. The ward committeeman, district leader, or layman may be the more prominent figure in the territorial arrangements. The management of a police-graft system depends upon the impermanence of tenure of the police commissioner, the inexperience of police executives, and the corruptibility of officials. Subordinate officers are controlled through fear of demotion. The operation of a smoothly running police-graft system depends on definite assignment of functions and fair distribution of the graft. It is facilitated by the police rule of silence.