Citation

Wood G. Econ. Peace Secur. J. 2018; 13(1): e300.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, Economists for Peace and Security (UK))

DOI

10.15355/epsj.13.1.35

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Belligerents could in principle avoid the ex post costs of conflict by revealing all private information about their violent capabilities and then calculating odds of success ex ante. Incentives to misrepresent private information for strategic gain, however, can cause miscalculations that lead to war. I argue some private information can lead to miscalculation not because it is purposefully misrepresented for strategic gain but because it is too decentralized to be easily revealed. The decentralized private information that produces improvised weapons requires a process of discovering suitable local resources and battlefield testing driven by local military entrepreneurs which frustrates information revelation. Decentralized private information used to improvise new weapons and capabilities like those which emerged in Afghanistan and Iraq show that it can take many years, decades, or even an indeterminate amount of time for fighting to reveal relevant information about violent capabilities.

Language: en

Keywords

Bargaining failure; decentralized information; discovery; improvised weapons; private information