Citation

Meng L, Kang Q, Han CF, Zhou MC. IEEE Trans. Intel. Transp. Syst. 2018; 19(2): 476-486.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers))

DOI

10.1109/TITS.2017.2697965

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The highly strategic nature of terrorist attacks has often frustrated attempts at locating emergency response facilities. To better determine the optimal location of such facilities, we present a leader-follower game between State and Terrorist by considering facility failures. The first stage of the game allows State to make a facility location decision and facility assignment to the attacked city, while the second stage allows Terrorist to select one city to attack after observing the State's strategy. The game is translated into a minmaxmin problem, and a population-based heuristic algorithm is proposed to solve it. We evaluate the performance of both model and heuristic by using an emergency example. Our results indicate that the proposed algorithm is able to generate suitable facility location solutions, allowing us to deploy resources more efficiently during a terrorist attack to where they are needed.

Language: en

Keywords

disruption risk; emergency management; emergency response facilities; emergency services; facility assignment; facility failures; facility location; facility location decision; facility location solutions; game theory; Games; heuristic algorithm; Heuristic algorithms; highly strategic nature; leader-follower game; Location; Nash equilibrium; optimal location; optimisation; particle swarm optimization; Reliability; State strategy; Stochastic processes; terror response facilities; terrorism; Terrorism; terrorist attack; Uncertainty; Urban areas