Citation

Eisner HS. Safety Sci. 2000; 36(1): 1-18.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2000, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The paper is a critical review of the operation of the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority (CTSA) before and since the inauguration of the tunnel system. It considers four of its major decisions in relation to the tunnel fire hazard: (1) spacing of the cross-passages that link the running tunnels to the service tunnel and form the escape routes for people caught in a fire; (2) construction of shuttle carrier wagons for heavy goods vehicles involved in the severe tunnel fire of November 1996; (3) non-segregation of car drivers and passengers from their vehicles; and (4) requisitioning a Safety Case. It concludes that CTSA's decisions resulted in reduced safety in spacing and construction in (1) and (2), respectively, a lengthy theoretical and experimental study that followed a preconceived, rather than preceded a sought, solution in (3) and a Safety Case that followed rather than preceded construction. In all four examples an alternative decision in the direction of greater safety could have led to severe economic consequences for the tunnel project.