Citation

Frosch CA, Johnson-Laird PN. Acta Psychol. 2011; 137(3): 280-291.

Affiliation

University of Reading, Department of Psychology, Reading, RG6 6AL, UK.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.01.015

PMID

21504836

Abstract

One view of causation is deterministic: A causes B means that whenever A occurs, B occurs. An alternative view is that causation is probabilistic: the assertion means that given A, the probability of B is greater than some criterion, such as the probability of B given not-A. Evidence about the induction of causal relations cannot readily decide between these alternative accounts, and so we examined how people refute causal assertions. In four experiments most participants judged that a single counterexample of A and not-B refuted assertions of the form, A causes B. And, as a deterministic theory based on mental models predicted, participants were more likely to request multiple refutations for assertions of the form, A enables B. Similarly, refutations of the form not-A and B were more frequent for enabling than causal assertions. Causation in daily life seems to be a deterministic concept.

Language: en