Citation

Hesslow G. Brain Res. 2012; 1428: 71-79.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2012, International Brain Research Organization, Publisher Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.brainres.2011.06.026

PMID

21763643

Abstract

It is proposed that thinking is simulated interaction with the environment. Three assumptions underlie this 'simulation' theory of cognitive function. Firstly, behaviour can be simulated in the sense that we can activate motor structures, as during a normal overt action, but suppress its execution. Secondly, perception can be simulated by internal activation of sensory cortex in a way that resembles its normal activation during perception of external stimuli. The third assumption ('anticipation') is that both overt and simulated actions can elicit perceptual simulation of their most probable consequences. A large body of evidence, mainly from neuroimaging studies, that supports these assumptions, is reviewed briefly. The theory is ontologically parsimonious and does not rely on standard cognitivist constructs such as internal models or representations. It is argued that the simulation approach can explain the relations between motor, sensory and cognitive functions and the appearance of an inner world. It also unifies and explains important features of a wide variety of cognitive phenomena such as memory and cognitive maps. Novel findings from recent developments in memory research on the similarity of imaging and memory and on the role of both prefrontal cortex and sensory cortex in declarative memory and working memory are predicted by the theory and provide striking support for it. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled "The Cognitive Neuroscience".

Language: en