Citation

Connolly AC, Sha L, Guntupalli JS, Oosterhof N, Halchenko YO, Nastase SA, di Oleggio Castello MV, Abdi H, Jobst BC, Gobbini MI, Haxby JV. J. Neurosci. 2016; 36(19): 5373-5384.

Affiliation

Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755, Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, 38068 Rovereto, Trento, Italy.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2016, Society for Neuroscience)

DOI

10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3395-15.2016

PMID

27170133

Abstract

Common or folk knowledge about animals is dominated by three dimensions: (1) level of cognitive complexity or "animacy;" (2) dangerousness or "predacity;" and (3) size. We investigated the neural basis of the perceived dangerousness or aggressiveness of animals, which we refer to more generally as "perception of threat." Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we analyzed neural activity evoked by viewing images of animal categories that spanned the dissociable semantic dimensions of threat and taxonomic class. The results reveal a distributed network for perception of threat extending along the right superior temporal sulcus. We compared neural representational spaces with target representational spaces based on behavioral judgments and a computational model of early vision and found a processing pathway in which perceived threat emerges as a dominant dimension: whereas visual features predominate in early visual cortex and taxonomy in lateral occipital and ventral temporal cortices, these dimensions fall away progressively from posterior to anterior temporal cortices, leaving threat as the dominant explanatory variable. Our results suggest that the perception of threat in the human brain is associated with neural structures that underlie perception and cognition of social actions and intentions, suggesting a broader role for these regions than has been thought previously, one that includes the perception of potential threat from agents independent of their biological class. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: For centuries, philosophers have wondered how the human mind organizes the world into meaningful categories and concepts. Today this question is at the core of cognitive science, but our focus has shifted to understanding how knowledge manifests in dynamic activity of neural systems in the human brain. This study advances the young field of empirical neuroepistemology by characterizing the neural systems engaged by an important dimension in our cognitive representation of the animal kingdom ontological subdomain: how the brain represents the perceived threat, dangerousness, or "predacity" of animals. Our findings reveal how activity for domain-specific knowledge of animals overlaps the social perception networks of the brain, suggesting domain-general mechanisms underlying the representation of conspecifics and other animals.

Copyright © 2016 the authors 0270-6474/16/365373-12$15.00/0.

Language: en